Research on the complex features about Stackelberg game model with retailers have dualidentities
Authors
Liu Geng
Abstract
(Received January 18 2018, accepted March 11 2018)
This paper presents a 1-2 suppliers-retailers model with delayed bounded rationality. The retailers have
their own products, and their products aren\u2019t manufacturer\u2019s products\u2019 substitutes, products are epiphytic relation-
ship. The phenomenon of chaos and other complex phenomena are reported using stability region,bifu1rca-
tion,attractors etc. We also introduce delayed decision into the model, study the influence of delayed decision on the
stability of the model. The results show that the system\u2019s stability is mainly determined by the delay coefficient, ap-
propriate delay coefficient can enhance the stability of the system, the inappropriate delay coefficient will reduce the
stability of the system. In addition, we cannot simply think that more merchants adopt delayed decision can improve
the stability of the system. \u00a0